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LIABILITY OF A MASTER TO HIS SERVANT FOR DAMAGES
SUFFERED THROUGH THE NEGLIGENCE OF ANOTHER SERVANT.
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IV. CONCLUSION.
Lawlike other scienceshas settled principles,7upon which
its reasoning is founded. Unlike them, howeverits deduc-
tions sometimes run counter to conflicting d ctrines which mod.
ify their applicationo.
Public policy.and the necessities of business are the nA1-
prolific of these modifying principles. Th.refore no legal
doctrine is settled,except to transactions in a substantially
A
settled industry: transactions to which those doctrines have
been uniform~;" and7 eozisistently applied.
Law is the creature of social and conmmercial necessity:
the servant,not'not the lord,of society-and business. When
a new industry is developedold legal doctrines are applied.
If they minister to its wellfarethe law suffers no change;
butif they prove unwholesome and restrictivethe law must be
so modified as not * conflict with the wellfare of the busi-
ness: for,if the industry be a boon to the public)it is valued
more than the integrity of any legal doctrine. If courts do
not make the necessary modificationslegislatures will.
Legal doctrines,therefore,conform to the necessities of
the business whose transactions they are intended to regulate
and remain unsettled as long as that business is undergoing
rapid change.
The doctrine under consideration most frequently applies
to the operations of private corporations. Rulings upon liti-
gation arising out of their transactions have gone far to es-
tablish existing theories concerning a masters liability to
the servant for the negligence of his fellows.
The business of these corporationshowever,is of such re-
cent oligin that the doctrines applied to it are as changeable
as criminal law on the frontier. Jus *ce "ill1E,in Liverpool
Insurance Co. v . Massachusetts,says 0 The subject of the pow-
ersdutiesorightsand liabilities of corporations,thei! essen-
tial nature and characterand their relations to the business
transactions of the communityhave unredgone a change in this
country within the last half century the importance of which
can hardly be over estimated. They have entered so extensive-
ly into the business of our country,the most important business
of which is carried on by them-as banking companiesrailroad
companies,express companiestelegraph companies,insurance com-
panies ete.- and the demand for the use of corporate powersin
combining the capital and energy required to conduct these
large operationsis so imperative thatboth by statute and by
the tendancy of the courts to meet the requirements of these
public necessitiesthe law of corporations has been so modi-
fied,liberalized,and enlarged,as to constitute a brashch of
jurisprudence with a code of its own: due mainly to very re-
cent times. To attemptthereforeto define a corporation,or
to limit its powers by the rules which prevail when they were
rarely created for any other than municipal,purposes,and gener
ally by royal charteris impossible in this country and at
this time."
A doctrine with reference to the liability of a conpore-
tion as mastersettled by a decision of forty years standing,
may,therefore,\vith due respect to the distinguished; court pr-
nouncingitbe questioned;for fully nine tenths of the corpo-
rate business,developed in many new Plases and under various
new conditionshas since arrisen.
The immediate conduct of this business is necessarily in-
trusted to agents. Therefore the companis' liability for the
contractual and to tious acts of itsiagants'is a question of
vital importance to the company,the agents.,and the public.
There seems no difficulty in establishing the master's' li-
bility upon his agents contracts made within the scope of his
authority. Likewise,when strangers are injured by the negli-
gence of the companiY' agentsacting for the furtherance of
their masters interest and in the scope of their employment,
the master is liable.
In both of these cases the courts have uniformly held the
companies liable to out- side pabties'holding the agents act to
be the act of the master. No distinction was at first made
between an injured party who was a stranger and one who was
him self a servant. The distinction was first drawn in
Priestly v Fowler(3 Meeson and Wellsby): decided in the Eng-
lish court of Exchequer in 1837.
The plaintif was engaged b the defendant as a butc.er.
The defendant sent annther employee ,who drove the delivery
wagonto accompany and deliver some goods to the plaintiff;and,
by the negligance of the driversaid'-drive- was thrown to the
ground and injured. Thereupon he brought suit and obtained a
verdict against his employer for damages. An appeal was then
taken which resulted in a reversal of judgment.
Lord Abinger~delivering the opinion of the courlsaid"The
mere relation of master and servant never can imply an obliga-
tion on the part of the master to take more care of the ser-
vant than he may be reasonably expected to do of himself.
He isno doubtbound to provide for the safe-ty of his servant
in the course of his employment to the best of his judgment,
informationand belief. The servant is not bound to r1ik his
safety in the service of his master and mayif he sees fi; uo
decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury
to himself;and,in most of the cases in which danger may be in-
curred,if not in allhe is just as likely to be acquainted
with the probability and the extent of it as the master. IN
that sort of employment,especiallVy,which is described in the
5declarati n in this casethe plaintiff must have known as well
as the masterand probily better,whether the van was suffi-ie
cient,whethcr it was overloadedand whether it was likely to
carry him safely. In factto allow this sort of action to
prevail would be an encouragement to tho servant to omit that
diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise on
behalf of his master to protect him against the misconduct of
others who serve him:and which diligance and caution,wh ile
they protect the masterare a much better security against any
injury which the servant may sustain by the negligence of
others engaged under the same master than any recourse against
his master fot damages could possibly afford. "
It is questionable whether this decision is based more
largely on the fact that the plaintiff was a co-servant of the
driver ,or that the plaintiff was himself negligent. Therefore
the notion that this decision settled the English doctrine to
the effect that a master is not liable to his servant for in-
juries sustained by him through the negligence of another em-
ployee,vworking in common with him for the furtherance of a
common purposeis questionable though is conceded.
The earliest American decision tending to establish the
above rule was rendered by the Supreme Court of *cj-t Carolina
in 71rry v. The South Carelina Rail Road Company4February 181l)
The plaintiff was employed as firemEan on a locomotive used and
erployed by the defendants on their rail road. The injuries
out of which this accident arose were received by the plain-
tiff while engeged in the discharge of his dutie~s as fireman,
by reason of the engine on which he was employed being thrown
from the track by the negligence of the engineer who refused
of neglected to lessen the speed or stop the engine afetr his
attention had been called to the obstacle on the track which
occasioned the accident. The injmred servant brought suit and
recovered against the rail road company and the defendant :iov-
ed for a new trial.
Judge Evans,delivering the opinion of the court,recog-
nized the doctrine of agency as admitted in the leading case
of McManns,: v.Crickettand 2ollowed by all cases on that sub-
ject since--namely v That the master is liable for damages
caused by the act of his servant who is acting in good faith
within the scope of his authority for the furit.crance of his
masters interest. ;2
To exempt the rail roa,: company from liabilitythe court
must harmonize this case with the above doctrine of find some
legal reason for setting it aside.
The courtby the following quotation fro.- the opinion,
admits that if the injury had been done to a stranger the com-
pany would have been liable. " There is no questior," says the
court,3 that,in general,the principal is liable for* the acts
of the agentperformed in the execution of his agencyof in
and about the business of his principal. Thus the owner of a
rail road would be liable to passengers for injuries sustained
by the neligence of any of its servantssuperior or subordi-
nate,because it is implied in the un ertaking to carrynot
only that the road and cars are 5 .. but that the servants
employed are compete it and will perform their duty. So, als,
if one employ anagent to execute any work whereby an injury
may result to a 5tranger the law requires it to be done with
care,and if a stranger sustain an injury his princi-el is lia-
ble,as decided in O'Connell v.Strong (Dudley,265).n "But", the
court aCYs",in this c se the employee is neither a stranger
no- a passenger."
Therefore,there being" no precedent for holding the master
liable to a servant for acts of another servant,the court ;ran,
ted the motion:adding thatsince the servant is not liable tol.
the master for the acts of another servantthe master should,
therefore, be~held-not liable to the to-the servant for the L
acts of another servant.
The court denied that the engineer was in this case the
represe iautive of the company in doing the wrongful act which
injured the plaintiff.? It also maintained thathad the injur-
ed man been a stranger,!,tlie engineers act would have been the
act of the company and would have bound it as such.
What renders one and the same act of the engineer the
act of the company when a stranger is thereby injured and that
of a mere co-employee when a servant is injured does not ap-
pear from the reasoning,but it was acted upon as a mere arbi-
trary rule.
This decision is farther basedupon an interpretation of
the servants contract. The court imports into it a stipula-
tion by the servant to stand the ordinary risks of the employ-
ment. It farther -uses this question,"Since the servant con-
tracts to take the ordinary risks of the service,why ntn the
extraordinary ones as well?
Th[ s interpretation of the contract is answered in the
following terms by Justice O'Neall in a dissenting opimion.
K- says" I admit hereince for allthat the plaintifflike any
other ervant,took,as a consequence of his contractthe usual
and ordinary risks of his employment.
What is meant by this? No more than that he could not
claim for an imjury against which the ordinary prudence of his
employers,their agents,ar himselfcould\provide. When ever
negligence is made out as the cause of injuryit does not re-
sult from the ordinary risks of the employment."
Littlejtherefore, seems to come of the seevants implied
contract to assume the ordinary risks of his employment;for
no reason could import the nejligence of reckless and irrespon-
L-I
sible men into the reasonable, ordinary risks of' an orderlywel
conducted business,done in a quasi-l;ublic capacity,exclusively
by hired agents,and upon the safety of which the well fare of'
the traveling and busine-;s public depends.
It was strongly urged by a minority of this bench that tht.
reasoning if the court failed to sustain its position;but,
since this decisionthe conclusion has obtained substantial
recognition by the courts of this country and England*
Stated brieflyit is as follo-s. 'zA master or em-loyer
is not responsible to his servants for injuries, uffered by
them in cansequence 9f the negligence,carelessness, or mis-
conduct of his other servants engaged in the same general em-
ployment;unless the employer has himself been at fault either
in negligently furnishing unsafe appliances for his employees,
retaining such ap-liances after their unsafe condition is
known to him,employing fellow-servants known to him as unsafe,
or negligently and willfully retaining such servants after +t,
their true character is known to him.'h
Although the case just criticised laid down tLe above
ruleyet it was not placed upon a solid foundation of legal
reasoning till Justice Shaw pronounced the opinion in Farwell
v., The Boston and Wooster Rail RoadCompany (38. Am. Dec. 339,
decided by the Supreme Court of Mass.in March 1842),.
The plaintiff,an engineer in the employ of the defendant,
was injured through the negligence of a switch tender. He
sued and obtained a verdict against the compahy who brought tt-
case to the Supreme Court upon appeal.
Chief Justice Shaw,delivering the opinion of the court,
said " The rule (of McManus v. Crickett.1 East,106) is founded
on the great principle of sooial duty that every man in the
management o f his own af'airs,whether by himself or by his
agents or servantsshall so conduct them as not to injure an-
other:and;if he does not and another sustains damage thereby,
he shall answer for it. If done by a servant in course of
his employmentand acting within the scope of his authority,
it is consideredin contemplation of the law,-o far the act of
the master that the latter shall be answerable civiliter.
The court thus recognizes that the decision must satisfy
the doctrine of agency. The learned judge then proceeds to
place the doctrine relatingf1to co-servants upon the sound
basis of public policy. He imports into the servants contratt
an implied agreement to watch over the conduct of the servantf
employed with him in a conon task,to restrain him if he be
negligentto report him to headquarters if he persist in neg-
ligence,to leave the employment if he prove an unsafe co-labor
er and is not discharged)or to pay the penalty of taking his
own risks if accident occur.
This holding realy places upon employees the dut' of mu-
tual supervision under the penalty of standing their owi, risks
should they fail to exercise it;and thusby making all respon-
sible for the carefullness of eac .,insures a more care full
body of servants and promotes the safety and welfare of people
and property committed to their care,
This is analogous to the F4ank Pledge of William the
Conqueror whereby he made a community pay the penalty of a
crime connitted by, one of its members- and thus made it the
keeper of its own peace and order whether it would or no.
The following further quotati:,n justifys this position.
"But this tdoctrine of McManus V. Crickett) does not apply to
the case of a servant bringing his action alairst his own em-
ployer t recover damages for an injury arising inthe crirse
of that employment,where all such risks and perils as the erm-
ployer and servant respectively intend to assume and bearmay
be regulated by express or implied contract between them and
which,in contempletion of law,must be presumed to be thus rega
lated.
This further quotation also tends to place the doctrine
upom public policy.,'
"In considering the rights and obligations arising out
of particular relations,it isocompetent for courts to regard
considerations of policy and general convenience and draw from
them such rules as willin their practical application,best
promote Yhe safety of all concerned. This is the basis upon
which implied promises are raised,"
"Theylpassenger carriers) are heli to strict responsibil-
ity for care,vigilanceand skill,on the part of themselves an"t
all persons employed by them;and they are paid accordingly.
The rule is founded upon the expediency of throwing the risk2
upon those who can best guard against it."
"Vhen several persons are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise or undertakingand the safety of each de-
pends much on the care and skill with which each other shall
perform his appropriate duty,each is observer of the conduct
of the otherscan give notice of an misconductincapacity,or
neglect of dutyand leave the service if the common employees
will not take such precautions and employ such agents as the
safety of the whole party may require. By these means the saf-
ty of each will be much more effectually secured than could be
done by resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of
loss by negligence by each other."
As the servants in this case were so ;laced as to have an
opertunity to exercise a supervising eye and restraining care
over each otherthis case settled the doctrine beyond a doubt.
The learned justice went farther however andrelying on the
theory of a fiction od ] w in the contract,laid down a rule
so sweeping and comprehensive as to work inj stice in many
cases where it has been loosly followed andLo contradict even
the consideration of policy upon .vhich the rule is btsed., He ]-
holdssubstantially,that all who are not em-,loyers are co-
workers and that the master is exempt from responsibility for
an injury to any servant by the negligence of another servant:
that a servant is a servant,and youi.cant make any thing else
out of him lalthough,in rare instancesnegligence may be traced
through him to the master.
This decision thus recognizes two independent grounds./onej
of public policy and the other~one of irn lied agreement impor-
ted by the court into the contract of service.
Some courts claim that this is a mere matter of interpre-
tation ofO the contract itself:the courts conviction of the
fair intendment of the contracting parties. The majority,howJ
everhold it to be a fiction of lawan implied contract run-
ning collateral tb the original agreement.
The application of the doctrine that a servan t engages
with reference to both the ordinary and extraordinary --isks
of the employmentincluding even the negligence of irresponsi-
ble agents.orks a hardship in many instances which Justice
Shaw contemllated when he placed the following caution at tha
close of his opinion.
in cc'ing to the conclusion that the plaintiff in the
present case is not entitled to recoverconsidering it as in
some measure a nice questionwe wo,'ld caution against any
hasty conclusion as to the application of this rule to a cse
not fully within the same principle. It may be modified and
varied by circumstances not appearing in th]e present case."
VIODIF1CATIONS OF THE GEI'NER-L RULE.
The frequent necessityfor the modification of this rule
as applied to particular casesand the toning down of its
harshmess by liberal interpretatinnq,hav given most perplex-
ing --roblems lo the courts. The increasing increment of cases
apising for its application as corporate business multiplies
and expands,and the numerous instances which have developed in
which the strict rule would work oppressionhave demanded its
frequent modification and, sometimes ,even its reformation by
the courts and,in some instances its partial abrogation by
st atute.
The frequent difference of judicial opimion concerning who
are fellow servants within this rtle,whether there are servant
"w;ithout as well as w" ithin itwhether.-the master is liable to
his servant when he has entirely wit idrawn his discretion and
bestowed it upon a superior employee whose will is thus made
to take the place of the masters will all these have furnished
occasion for a labyrinth of decisions to suit the justice and
circumstances of particular cases through which it is quite
impossible or any legal light to penetrate so as to develoP
from the chaotic mass a settled,harmonious,and consistent ien-
oral doctrine.
One distinct line of cases places the liability of the
master solely u, om his exercise-or neglect- oi' reasonable ca:' ;
ardif he has si ovm this -o the best of his knowlodoe and abil-
ty,in selkcting safe ap->liances and ordinarily skillfulsober,
and safe co-sermants,the courts exempt him from liability for
any--damage suffered b) a servant in consequence of the negli-
.ence of another employee (independently of any ot!cer consider
ation);unless it appear that the servant .ras a notoriously un-
safe co-'orkman;and that that fact was for sometime known to
the de.fendant) or was so bald that he was 7 ilty of gross negli-
gence in not discovering it and pnioviding against the danger.
Here, again, a net work of cases, presenting a plexus of
holdings to suit various facts and circunstnces,bars the w.,ay.
"Ihat constitutes a dangerous servant ,'_ose habits the master
should know?to what Sgents ncay such facts be known an-- thereby:
charge the master with knowledge? What amount of care must the
master use in selecting the servant? May he delegate that duty
to another servant and be held for that servants neglect? How
far may the injured servant havetCtrusted the masters o%'over-
sees discretion and not pay the penalty of such confidence bly
losing his legal remedy? These and manyother as per- Ilexing
questions trip and tanible the courts.
Another line of' c7.ses holds that the true doctrine is
based on the purpose of the courts to compel' servants to
watch over and restrain the careless conduct of oneanother,to
report such misconduct to headquarters,to avoid a persistnitly
in order that servants mray be made supervisors of each others
conduct and thereby a higher,s ,fer,more sober and careful line
of servants may be secured to the public whose property and
personal safety so largely falls within their hands.'
Their theory is that the rule was framed in the nature
of a penalty for the public good;and that employees have ample
oppertunity to protect the publicif compelled to do so,and,
at the same timeto guard their own safety. They object stren-
uously to the doctrine that ah employee contracts to run all
the risks of the employment arising from both the negligence
of irresponsible servants and from accident. They urge that to
enforce this rule in cases where thlirajured party had no opper-
tunity to observe the conduct of the negligent party,to cxer-
cise a restraining influence over him, or to forsee and avoid
danger,would convert a rule ,intended for the general :ielfare,
into an engine of oppression:an arbitrary conclusion drawn
from precedent without investigating its fundamental reasons
and a contradiction of the considerations of policy upon which
it was founded,
17
This view seems to coiivend itself to ieason and sound bus-
iness principlesand thev.oourts mip4t co: e to a unifoni and
consistent line of holdips on this basis which 'vould preserve
the stability of the general rule and give litigants a fair
assu . ance under all jurisdictions.
Thishappily~is the tendancy of courts at present:especidl
:Ily t ose untrameled courts of new states whose actions are
not circ mscribed by bare " red and riveted precedent :courts
7:hich base their decision upon reason rather than holding.
The United States Courts 'ustain this position and it is estah-
lishedby the opinions of eminent judges in Mich 1 ,Penn.,1nd.,
Ill., Ky., Tenn., Ga., Cal.,and the incoming state of Washing-
ton:a> approach is established in Ohio;and Iowa, Kansasand
some other states have settled it by statute.
When a servant,not himself at fault,is injured by the
negligence of ine in the same business acting in good faith fM-
the interests of his masterthis construction of the rule
holds the master:providing the negligent servant is in a dis-
tinct branch of the business and there is to oppertunity of
mutual oversight,and no means are afforded one to avoid the
dangers arising from the negligence of the other.
A fai conclusion from this confirms the theory that thev&
are employees,not fellow servants within the rule. but diffi-
culties beset and complications buffet us at every tarn. The
ingenuity of courts has been strained to determine what
18
constitutes distinct branches of a business. No test has been
found which may be employed to meet tie circumstances of all
cases.
IvIMO ARE C(- IPLOYEES \ITHI14 TIIE RULl".
Slin of cases holds that a master mechanic,a surveyor,
a workman in a repair sJ.opand a brid, "e carpenter are not co-
employees in the same sense vith the servants running the rail
road companies trains another,that a train hand on a freight
is not a co-employee with one in a simil r position on an ex-
p ess;onethat a track foreman is not a co-servant with the
shovelers;and another,that the conductor is n~t a co-employee
with the train boy whom he ordered to d& duty as a brakeman.
Another line of cases hold Yhe above as co-servants with
in the rule and refuses to suspend its operation unless the ep
employees derive their contracts from two masters and their
pay from distinct sources.
Foster v. Minn.etc. R.R.Co.(i4 Minn.360? lays down the
following generally accepted rule."Servants in the employient
of the same master,under the same general controland engaged
in promoting the same common object are co-employees.
Here the courts again split and travel towards various
points of the compass in determining what servants are engaged
in promoting one conmxon object. one holds that they must labvl/
19
togatherland declares car-roofers injr. d by the ne ,,ligence of
train-ii, n, to be without the rule, Another holds all servants
of the same master, as such,to be wit!,-in the rale. Anoti:er,
takes an intermediate position and applies other testa: one
testing bx the character of the servant's act and another by
his relativo rank.
The Ohio cases make the Mass. rule read thus." Servants
in the employment of the same master,under the same general
controland engaged in promoting the -ame connon object, VJHE Ri
NTO CONTROL IS IVEN TO 07E OVER THE OTHER, are fellow.z servantS,
This raakes servantsin different branches of the business co-
employeesbut overseers and foremengy not co-servants with
workmen under their control. This was held in WHalan V.MAd
River etc. R.R.Co.( 8 Ohio 249),as the result of Little Miami
R.R.Co. Y,'v. Stevens (20 OHIO 415. ),and Cleveland etc. R.R.do.
v. Keary.(6 Ohio 201);and is settled law in Ohio.
Another line, led by the Farwell case in Mass. and Murry
v. South Carolina bo. in S.C., holdsthat the same consideratiun
of public policy which exempt the master in one case extent to
all cases without regard to, the relative grades of employment.
They also~hold that all employees contract to stand the risks
incident to the employment,and that the negligence of all
employees in the sane business is one of those risks ?
The statement of these casesand the analysis of their
holding have been sufficiently entered upon in the early part
of this paper. The New York Courts, with the exception of two
important modifications engrafted on to the general rule,have
substantially followed their holdings. Never he less,they
claim to have discarded the reasoning in precedent cases and
to have settled the rule om strict cofpmon law principles.
The consi eration of the second line of cases to which
this paper referes naturally follows the examination of
THE NEW YORK DOCTRINE.
This doctrine is settled by three distinctcollateral
lines of holdings apparently not tresspassing upom one anotheE
grounds. One line settles the doctrine concerning employes in
distinct branches of the masters servise;one,,as to the masters
liability for lack of reasonable care in not performing cer-
tain duties which the courts hold him bound to perform toward
the injured servant;and one,settling the rule for determining
whem a servant is a vice principal and binds his principal by
his negligent act.
The first line of cases begins with Coonxv. The Syracuse
and Utica R.R.Co. In the first of Selden.
This action was brought by a track walker who was injured
while on duty by a state train passing at an unusual hour and
negligently running at night with out lights. This b'ou&Lt the
21
question squarely before the court.,,;and,although the plaintiff
was in a distinct branch of the service,they held him a co-em-
ployee of the train men.
Two judges vrote opinions which were no more than cita-
tion and approval of the Farwell,Murry and Priestly cases.
This question came up sudcessivelyon facts involving the
same principle,and with similar results founded upom substan ,
_t(ally the same citationsin Sherman v. The R chester and Syra-
cuse R.R.Co.(17 '.Y. ),in holt v. The Central R.R.Co.(18 NT.y.),
in Ross v. Central R.R.Co. ( 5Hun ),and in Vick v. Central R.R
Co. ( 95 N.Y.),
The last case was based mainly on the Ross casebut also
relied upon the entire line of decisions. Therefore the Murry
and Farwell cases contain the sum total of the New York doc-
trine upom this important question.
The facts of the Vick case were these.---- George Vick
resided in Rochester,and was employed as foreman of the tin-
shppo of the rail road company at Buffalo. He was paid bybthe
hour for his time while in the shops;andas a part of the
contract of employment,was daily carried free of charge on the
defendants trainsbetween his home -in Rochester tnd the shops
at Buffalo. Negligent trlin men run another train into the
one on which Vick was riding and injured him. He brought suit
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and recovered against the company for his injuries.
The court of Appeals',reversing the trial court and Gener-
al Termheld that th2 plaintiff could not recover, on the grout
that he was in the ccmpany's service while thus traveling on
its trains. This being established,the mere citations of the
other cases settled the question.
Nothing could be more distinct than the employment of
Vick and that'of the conductor who caused the injury. A aingle
treasury from which they drew their pay was the only thing
common to the stationg.
This firmly establishes the doctrine,in New York that all
servantsperforming their duties toward the masterare co-em-
ployees without the slighest regard to the relation of their
duties. Even an attorney of a rail road,traveling free of
charge on its train to reach his field of duty for the company4
could not recover for injuries sustained from the negligence .
of a section bosq;for he is a co-employee laboring with him
for a common purpoee.
The second line o' New York cases begins with Wright v.
Central R.R.Co. (25 N.Y.).
One Uptonwhose business was to employ and discharge
engineers for the companyordered ah engineer who was skillful
but new to the road,to take a sick engineers place and run an
express train from Suspension Bridge to Rochester in the night,
Adams,the enginoer,protested that he was incompetent to take
the train over the road in the night till he became better
acquanted with it. Never the lesshe proceeded to carry out
the order;and~a collisi n occured through his inability to de-
termine whether a certain train,which he was to meet at one
of the stationswas side-tracked,statding,or in motion. The
collision injured a brakeman who brought suit aainst the com-
pany for damages.
The Court of Appeals held that the accident was not the
result of any lac# of skill in the engineer which was known to
the companyand laid down th1 following principles.
1. tThe master is liable to the servant for- injury occur-
ing through his own misconduct and negligenceand this may
consist in the employment of unfit or incompetent co-agents
and co-servants or in providing impliments,machineryor facili-
ties for the use tof the servant in tne accomplislxnentwhich ae-
improper or unsafe for the purpose~i-& of their application."
2.3 The master does not undertake with his servant for the
skill or competency of his emploqees;nor for the continued
sufficiency or safety of the materiels or impliments furnished
for the work,or for the convenience of the. laborers but is only
bound to exercise reasonable care in the selection and employ-
ment of the co-servants,and in the original selection of the
material apliances;and,in the case of material or impliments
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badoming defective or insufficient,from subsequent causeshe i
is only ans erable for injuries arising therefrom in those
instances in which he personally knew,or ought to have known
of the defect or insufficiency."
The question again arose in Lanning v. The Certral R.R.CQ
(49 N.Y. ).this made the important addition of the pollowing
principle." If the master delegates to te- agent the duty of
employing workmen,of of originally selesting physical applian-
ces for the conduct of the businessthe master is responsible
to any servant wh- suffers injury from the legligence of that
agenjt in the performimgon of that duty."
It appears that the laintif" Lanning was employed as
carpenter for the Central Rail Road C~jmpany. His work requir-
ed the building Of-,a staging and the defendants foreman, while
intoxicated~ordered the staging to be built in a-n unskillful
manner and left in an unsafe condition* It fell and injured
the plaintiff who blought suit and recovered against the co,-
pany.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and laid down
the principle as above stated.
The principle of the last two cases was followed in
Flike etc. v. Boston & Albany R.R.Co.(53 N.Y. )and remain un
change d.
The line of de:rarkation between the second and third
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lines of New York decisions is less emphatic than between the
first and secondbut it is none the less distinct. The third
line of decisions swings away from the long line of precedents
binding the other 'and formulates a clear cut rule by which to
determine,in anycase,whether a servant is a co-employee or a
vice-principal.
Two cases ( Crispen v. babbitt,81 N.Y.); and Shehen v.
N.Y. Cent. and H.R.R.R.Co., 91 N.Y. )contain the entire theory
upon which this formula is based.
In the former case one John Rabbitt,the nephew of B.T.
Babbitt and financial manager of the latters foundry in
WhitesboroughN.Y.,odrered a workman to turnthe fly wheel of
an engine beyond the dead point. While the servant was turn-
ing the wheel Babbitt let the steam onto tl. engine. The fly-
wheel caught and severely injured the workman who brought suit
and recoveragainst the master B.T.Babbitt.
The Court of Appealsafter a strong contestevidenced by
a powerful dessenting opinion delivered by Judge Earl and con-
curred in by Judges Finch and Danforthheld the master not
liable, all conceded that John Babbitt was,,the vice-principal;
and that hisacts,AS SUCH, bound the master;but the majority of
the court held him not a vice-principal in the performance of
the acts of a mere employee. Hencethe formular--4The duties
NOT THE STATION,of an employee determine whether he is the
alter ego of the master. If the master,even,performs duties
belonging to the servant,he thereby becomes a mere co-employee
for the time and is exempte from liability for his own negli-
gence resulting in damages to his servant althoug. he would be
liable should he order another servant to perform the same
act in a similar manner in his presence.
Shehen v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.R.Co. reinforces this rule by the
converse of the same proposition.
The plaintiffs intestate was a fireman on a west bound
Wild-cat train on the Auburn branch of defendants rail road.
A regular train was running east toward Cayuga as the west
bound train approached Auburn. A general rule of the company
required wild-cat trains to progress from station to station y
special orders from the train dispatcher. An order was sent to
the wild-cattrain at Auburn to proceed to Cayuga and there
meet the east bound train. This order was properly delivered
and the train proceeded toward Cayuga. At the same time the
dispatcher sent an order to the operator at Cayuga directing
him to hold the east bound train for further orders.
The duty of the operator was to execute this order by
delivering it to the conductor and engineer'which hethrough
forgetfullnessfailed to do. In a moment the train was beyond
his reach and a collision Aesulted which caused the death of
the plaintiffs intestate. An action was brought against the o--
company for the killing- of the fireman.
The court of Appeals held the company liable on the fol-
lowing grounds.
liThe corn any were under a duty of furnishing to their
emnloyuees a code of rules sufficient for their safety in the
running of trains--which,wasin thJis case,done.
2. The company was under just as positive a duty to furn-
ish its employees with suffici nt and timely notice of any
deviation from the re -ular rules whereby they were thrown into
danger--whichwas,in this case,not done.
3. In car'rying out this special order to deviate from
the time table,the operator at Cayuga would have c~one NOT THE
S. RVANTS DUTY TOWARD THE MASTER BUT THE MASTERS DUTY TOWARD
THE SERVANT ,ANDAS HE FAILED TO CARRY IT OUT,H1S MIASTER THERE4
BY FAILED TODO AN IMPERATIVE DUTY WHICH HE ATTEMPTEDTHROUGH
HI1M,T( PER-OEM.
THE OPERATOR WAS THE ALTER ErJO IN THIS CASEOF THE MASTER.
This corallary rollows from the holding---if the master
authorizes a servant of any grade to perform any duty which he
owes to his employees,that servant stands in the masters place"
andf,if his negligent performance or that duty injures another
servanT,his master is liable. TIUS A \rATER BOY MAY BECO, E A
VICE-PRINCIPAL OF THZ MOST POV\ERFUL RAIL ROAD OAJIPAiNY.
The holdings cited in this paper have established the
duties of the master toward his servants to be substantially.
1. To furnishto the best of his knowledge and ability,
proper servantssafe machinery and appliancesand an ample
code of regulations for the safe conduct of his business.
2. To use reasonable care in keeping the machinery and
appliances in a safe condition and in seeing to itto the best
of his knowledge and abilitythat the co-servants remain sobeV
skillful,and safe.
3. To notify the employees when they are put in danger b,;
unsafe appliancesmachenery,or premises.
4. To warn thesservants of any change in the regulations
whereby they are thrown into danger.
5. To furnish a servant a safe place to work.
Damages to one employee through the negli .ence of another
which do not,in some particular,involve the necessary breach
of some one or more of the above dutiesof the master,arepret-
ty generally in New York,held to have been the result of risks
incident to the employment which the servant is held to have
contracted to stand.
The New York courts claim to have rejected all -recedent
and to have decided this doctrine on commonlaw principles.
Stated in a nut-shell~it is this.
You sue a master --- for what---negligence. The courts say
"Very well,prove your 'case and we'll h old him." Nowifin try-
ing to prove your case,you fail to establish a breach of any
of the masters duties,he is not ne?-ligent;and the court will
say"The one you have sued for negligence is not negligent;you
have put your finger on another man:you hav'nt proved thor caeL-
stuited in your complaint,and you must fail in your action.
But if you establish a breach of one of those duties;
either by the master or by any one whom he has directed to pep
form it;and that you were injured thereby;you have established
HIS NEGLIGENCE and you can recover.
Again,if you only establish the negligence of the master
or vice-principal IN PERFORMING THE SERVANTS DUTIES TO THE
MASTER,and that you were thereby injured,you have failed to
show the masters negligence~for no breach of his duties has
occured: Your action musts therefore, fail.
But it is possible to hang logical weights on this mastep
ly reasonin .Some-..ay!-say)'TNhy is the negligence of an employe
in a distinct branch of the service one of the risks incident
to the srvants employment?The answer is " Because the law
makes it, so." Then why does the law make it so? "Becausefrom
the nature of the case,it is one of the risks.
Again,--If the negligence of a servant is one of the risk
necessarily incident to the employment,why is not the negli-
gence of the master an incident risk: upon what do you base
any logical distinction?the answer is the same."Because the
law makes the masters neg'ligence not one of the risks." Then
why does the law make it so? "Because it is not one of the
risks."
Again,--Why are the masters duties toward the servant
those which the courts have enumerated? "Because the courts
have declared them to be the duties." Why did the courts so
declare them? Because they are the masters duties." Why is'nt
the master compelled ro warrent the safety of his machinery,
appliances,an employees? "Because the law does not make tha
one of his duties." Why does not the law make itone of his
duties? "Because it is not one of them."
These are only arbitrary rules: Theyiare not conclusions
from principles or deductions from legal premises. They are
assumptions upon which legal reasoning had been based. There-
foreif any tribunal refuses to accept themall the reasoning
based upon them fails.
Courts of last resort in several states refuse to accept
them. They differ concerning the risks incident to the employ-
ment and the duties which the master owes his servant. They n,
hold the negligence o a co-servant in a distinct branch of
the business not an incident risk which the employee assumes
by his contract;and that the master has not performed all of
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his duties toward his servants by placing a seemingly fitbut
really recklessforeman over them or a seemingly fitbut realy
dissapated and un-afe,servant among them.
Three out of seven judges o2 the New York court are in
sympathy with this more liberal view. To confirm this belief,
note the dissenting opinion of Judge Earl in Crispen V. Babbit
Concerning the proposition that the middle man is a vice-prin-
ci>al when doing masters work and a co-servant when doing
servants work he says."The middle man thus occupies a dual po-
sition:that of co-servant as to all matters within the scope
of his employment and the discharge of such matters as are not
personal toor absolute upon the master,and as a vice-princi-
nal as to all matters where he abuses his authotity,or is
charged with the discharge of duties which the master himself
should have discharged,or which rest upon the master as abso-
lute duties.
I have made a thorough examination of the cases reported
in this country and in England,and I think I may safely affifrm
that there is no case in which the question was raised where
this dual relation has been recognized and the rule thus laid
down."
Speaking of the grounds of the Mass. holding he says"As A
the masters responsibility has been extended by the doctrine
of respondeat superarior from considerations of PUBLIC POLICY,
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so that doctrine has been limited by similar consideration2, in
respect to tj e ma1ter_ rpQnsibility to his servants. THE
LIMITATION HAS NO FOUNDATION IN ABSTRACT OR NATURAL JUSTIC.,
AND ALL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE IT ON ANY OTHER iOUNDALION THAN THAT
OF PUBLIC POLICY WILL PROVE UNSAT1SFACYORY WHEN BROUGHT TO THE
TEST OF CAREFULL AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS."
Refering to the better protection of servants when made
to relY upon their own vigilence rather than that of a master,
he says"To enforce the supposed public policy a fiction has
been invented by which the servant is said to assume all the
risks of the service which include the negligence of co-ser-
vants in the same common employment. If this fiction were
literally applied,if it were held that every servant entering
into the service of a master assumed all the risks incident to
such service,the master would not be responsible to the ser-
vant for his own negligence,as that would be as much an inci-
dent to the serv-ce asthe negligence of a co-servant.
Refering to a superintendent he says"it is not too much z-
for a master to be responsible for his negligence. He is gen-
erally a person selected with care,of superior judgmemt and
skill,and is,more generally than other servants,able to re.--'
spond to his master for his own negligence. ican perceive no
reason founded on public policy,as there is none founded any
principle of natural justicefor limiting the doctrine of
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respondeat superior in its application to the relations betwen
the master and sudh an agent. The master shotld be responsib&
fo all his negligence while engaged in the service;because he
stands in his place representing him as his alter es9;and I
can percieve no reason founded upon public policy and expedi-
ency for enforcing that doctrine in such a case in favor of
strangers,which does not exist for enforcing it in favor of
the oVher servants of the conmion master.
This shows the minority of this court to be in sympathy
with an approach to the rule laid down by the English statute.
(1880) Ailine of holdings,settled in seven states establishes
an approach to this rule. The examtnation of a tipical case
and a citation of others is all the work that limited sp.ce al-
lows in this important field.
In Gillenwater v. Mlad&3on & Co, R.R.Co.(5 Ind. 339) The
plaintiff Gillenwater was employed as a bridge carpenter by thE
defendant,but was directed to proceed on the defendants cars
to a station a short distance from the bridge to assist in
loading timbers. The cars were thrown from the track by the
negligence of the train mun and Gillenwater was injured.
Refering to the Farwell case 'the courts say,"Between the
switch tender and the engineer of the company the connection.
was close and immediate. The object to be accomplished by
both was the same. Their _uties necessarily connected them-
selves togather as parts of a whole. The passing of the cars
in a given direction was the instant result flowingufrom their
joint action.
Not so with the plaintiff in this case. His business as
carpenteras applied to the erection of a rail road bribgedid
not even remotly link him with the careless management of that
particula~r train---Toughi in some a servant of the companyhe
was not a co-servant of the engineer and conductor,within the
meaning of the Farewell case. He clearly belonged to a dis-
tinct department of duty.
If the bridge-builder of the company be regarded as, a co-
servant of the engineer within the meaning of the Priestly add
Farwell cases,the principlb becomes alike vicious and abserd,
by the very extent of its application. Every person in the
srrvice of the company is brought within its range. Even the
position of the legal adviser oi the rail road is included. He
to,is in some measure the company's servant. He derives his
compensation and authority from the same source as the engin-
eerconductor,and bridge-builder. Like themthough in a fain-
ter degree,he contributes to the ultimate objects of the com-
pany. Had he been on the train by tle side of Gillenwater,and
injured by the same negligence,in.a suit against the company
he too would have been dismissed by the same argument. He
would have been told that the action was one of new impression,
that he contracted with reference to the risks of employment,
and reserved a compensation in fees with an eye to these risks,
He wvouldtherefore,be denied redress because he was a quasi-
coservant of the careless engineer. It would be difficult to
ima-ine upon what principleseither of justice or public ol-
icy,such ruling could be supported. For the basis of implied
contract and increased cornpensation,with reference to such
risks,on the part of the conductor and legal advisor,i2 wholly
visionary.
But when it is held that the legal advisor,the carpenter,
and all such quasi-servants of the company are not co-servant
within the meaning of the Farwell case,because their several
duties belong to different departments;a result is attained,
clear,justsand of easy application.
Had Gillenwater recieved the injury from the nerligence
of a fellow carpenter in the same employment,while erecting
the bridgeor loading the timbersa question would then have
been presented within the range of the Farwell case."
This doctrine was maintained in Penn. by 0 Donnell v.
Allegany etc. R.R.Co. (59 Penn. St.):also a bribge carpenter
case,the Ill. court sustained it in Chicago etc. R.R.Co. v. Mo
randa ( 93 111.), Tenn. courts carry the doctrine to the ex-
treme o the Ill. courts in East Tenn. R.R.Co. v. DeArmond,
Kentugky courts make the master liable for gross negligence of
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a co-serv:nt-Louisville R.R.Co. v. Collins (2 Duval 114),Judge
Cooly sustaines it in Chicago & .I.W.R.H.CO. v. Bayfield (37
Mich. ),and this is followed in 17 Wall. 556.
Judge Cooly reasons that sincebetween a master and a
stranger .,ovpr~aerfs act is the act of the masterupon what
legal grounds is it not the act o." the principal as between
the master and another servant.
STATEIMENT OF THE DIFFERENT RULES.
From the wilderness of precedents,legal principlesand
statuteswe have evolved five distinct doctrines which,for
convenience ,may be designated as fellows.
1. The Massachusetts rule,--exempting the master from the
consequent damages to one servant from the negliE;ence of anotilb
in the same business:witLt regard to their relative rank or
the distinct character of their duties.
2. The Ohio rule,-- so modifying the above rule as to
make the master liable for damages to a servant arising from
the negligence of one whom the master has placed in authority,
over him.
3. The New York rule,--making the character of the act
govern entirely. It holds one doing masters duties toward the
servant to ,be a vice-principal and one doing servants duties
toward the master to be a co-employee. This makes a servantes
character oscilating.oe may be alternately the one or the
other as he passes from duty to duty.
4. The public policy doctrine.
This holds that the servants contract to stand the risks
of the employment is a fiction of law imported into the agree-
ment as an implied contract:that this is founded in publie
poli cy:that,by compelling servants laboring togather to guard
one anothers conduct at their perilsafer servants will be
furnishedwhere peoples lives and pro1 erty are committed to
their care:that the reason upom vrhich this implied contract is
based fails where the grades of service are entirely distinct;
that,where this reasin fails,the courts are not justified in
assuming such a contract to have been intended.
5. The statutory doctrine.
Statutes in England and several of the United States
reach a result justified by * the fourth doctrine.
The third,fourth,and fifth rules arose from the desire
of legislatures and courts to braw away from the hardships of
a rule which has grown oppressive in many instances as busi-
ness has extended its application.
CONFLICT.' OF DOCTRINES.
These theoriescould they be so construed as to stand to-
gather and reach similar results. B tIsre in a di-
ct But the courtme
contenetd discord and desire uniformity even if it must come
through the medium of healingf statutes.
Judge Thompson in his work on negli encein illustrating
one of these principlesconcludes that a master mechanic of a
rail road is not a co-emlpoyee with the fireman (Vol.2 Page
1032);andin illus rating another one (vol.2 Page lO35),is
forced to conclude that a master mechanic of a rail road is a
co-employee with the locomotive engineer.
A flagman;who negligently allows a train to pass him and
be wrecked on a bridge in process of repair; binds his master
in New Yorkfor injuries thereby resulting to the trainmen;but
the injured party is remediless in Massachusetts.
A train boy in the employ of the D.L.& W.R.R. is injured
at Binghanton by the ne:;liEence of the conductor. Since the
master is a resident of Pennsylvaniahe may bring ah action
and recover against the master in the United States Court.
(17 'all.553) or bring it in the state courts and be non-suitd
on the same cause of action.
CONCLUSION.
To comprehend all phases of this subjest in a limited
paper is impossible. Solid food has already be .n consumed to
a surfeit;but the supply seems to multiply with the consump-
tion,aid to exhaust it would require an indefinitely elastic d
devouring capacity. A critical discussion of holdings on all
the finer shades of distinction would require a volume instead
of this limited paper.
But the time has not yet arrived for a treatise on the
subject in hand. The growing necessities of undeveloped
branchies of industry will continue to drive courts and legis-
lat'ures togather on the important features of these yet unde-
veloped doctrine6 Time and business will solve these as they
have solved all other questions,when legal reasoningfrom dif-
ferent but equally legitimate yrounds~has failed to produce a
harmonious result. The crucible of tne coming half-century
will bring forth a purity and solidity of doctrine which no
legal dedugtions can now evolve. Then some master at the bar
will write the prorAsed treatise. A place awaits it beside the
productions of PomeroyStoryand Pollock;and it will stand
among the towering monuments in the literature of modern Ameri
can law.
Frank Cummings.

